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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
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DEDWARD C. SWEENEY

COMMENTS
INSURANCE-INJURY WHILE ENGAGED IN OR PARTICIPATING IN AVIATION.-

[Wisconsin] Plaintiff instituted this action on an insurance policy to recover
for disability because of physical injury sustained through being struck by
the propellor of an airplane while plaintiff was spinning same for the purpose of starting the motor. The sole question was whether or not plaintiff
was entitled to recover under a policy which provided: "The disability
benefit herein provided shall not be granted if the disability shall result
from * * * engaging or participating as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics." Held, plaintiff was engaged in peforming an act which
was so immediately connected with and incidental to the trip, on which
he was to embark, that he was engaging in aviation within the meaning
and intention of the exemption provision of the policy, and that he was
not entitled to recover any benefits. Blonski v. Bankers' Life Co., ... Wis.
24.3 N. W. 410 (June 20, 1932).
Exemption clauses have always been a legal battleground in insurance
cases. Courts from the very beginning have realized that a liberal construction of such clauses in favor of the insurer would reduce the insurance
business to a confidence game. The construction which they have placed
upon such clauses has therefore been such as to make insurance men wonder
whether human ingenuity is capable of devising exemption clauses which
will exempt.
Insurance cases arising in connection with the aeronautics are apt illustrations of this general trend. Quite a number of attempted clauses have
been before the courts and have mostly been construed against the contention of the insurer. In the course of this litigation a distinction between
the word "engage" and "participate" has found general approval. The
word "engage" has been confined to one who actually operates the airplane
(Gits v. New York Life Insurance Co., 32 Fed. (2d) 7; Masonic Acc. Ins.
Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628, 61 A. L. R. 840; Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 256 N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144)
while the word "participate" has been construed to cover a mere passenger
(Bew v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 95 N. J. Law 533, 112 At. 859, 14 A. L. R. 983;
Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 89 Cal. 779, 265 Pac. 400;
Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 17 Fed. (2d) 370. Outside of this distinction, however, little has been settled by litigation. The search for a clause
which will accomplish the purposes of the insurer therefore has not yet
been concluded.
The present case involves an exemption clause which certainly is the
most inclusive -of all which have come to the attention of the writer. It
exempts the insurer if the disability shall result from "engaging or participating as a pas r.nger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics." There
[661]
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can be no doubt but that this clause was draftd with a full understanding
of the cases decided by the courts in regard to ai).tion exemption clauses.
The insured was the president of the corporation which owned the airplane and was sufficiently advanced in the art of flying to hold a student's
license issued by the Department of Commerce and to do solo flights. He
took the airplane out of its hangar and cranked it with the intention of.
taxiing across the field to a filling station and then going into the air. He
was injured while twirling the propellor. The civil court of Milwaukee
County held that the exemption clause applied to the situation and denied a
recovery. A fee for entering judgment was paid by the attorney for the insurer but through some mistake the judgment was not actually entered.
While the matter was in this condition the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decided Charette v. PrudentialIns. Co. of America, 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W.
848, in which extensive parsing of the exemption clause there involved was
done by the court which reached the conclusion that the construction of
such clause was not free from doubt and that therefore it must be construed against the insurer. This decision gave new hope to the insured who
utilized the fact that the judgment had not been entered to appeal the
case to the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County which affirmed the decision
of the civil court. The appeal to the Supreme Court was a further consequence of the error of not entering judgment in the civil court.
The decision of the court is contained in the following words: Plaintiff in starting the motor incidental to beginning a trip was engaged in
performing an act which was so immediately connected with and incidental
to the trip, on which he was about to embark, that he was then engaging in
aviation or aeronautics, within the meaning and intention of the exemption
provision of the policy. Consequently, his disability resulted from a hazard
which was expressly exempted from the policy, and he was not entitled to
recover any benefits."
No fault can be found with this decision. The clause is not anloiguous
and evinces a clear intent to exclude aviation risks. The insurer certainly
has the right to exclude such risks if he sees fit to do so. The premium
collected is based on the risk assumed and therefore the risk should not
be extended beyond what the contract stipulates. From the point of view
of the insurer the clause is nearly if not wholly perfect. The only possible
improvement which has suggested itself to the writer is the addition of the
words "aeronautical activity" or "aeronautical operations." Insurance companies which wish to exclude aviation risks may well ponder this clause
and adopt it with or without the addition suggested.
CARL ZOLLMANN.

NEGLIGENcE-REs

IPSA

LOQUITUR-FAILURE

OF

AIRPLANE

MOTOR.-

[Mass.] This is an action to recover the value of clothing and personal
effects worn by and on the person of the plaintiff at the time of the accident
hereinafter described. The plaintiff testified that while the plane taxied
on the ground prior to taking off, the right wing motor backfired and emitted
clouds of smoke; that it was apparent to him that the right wing motor
did not revolve at the same speed as the others; that a few seconds after
leaving the ground the right wing motor went dead and the right side of
the plane tipped and that the pilot steering the plane made a nose dive
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into the water. The trial judge also received the testimony of the pilot and
that of a bystander who had a pilot's license and who testified to the dip
referred to in the plaintiff's testimony. The pilot testified to his handling
of the machine, that he had made a previous trip that day, that on arriving
at the airport he turned the machine over to inspectors and received it back
a few moments before he took off. He did not testify that it was inspecte6
but did testify that it was the custom of the inspectors to inspect. The inspectors did not testify. The pilot further testified that on leaving the
ground both motors were "revving" at the same rate, that he tested each
engine and found them both in good running order at the time of the takeoff. This was all the material evidence relating to liability. The plaintiff
requested among others the following charge: "5. That the plaintiff has
established a res ipsa loquitur case, and the defendant must explain the
cause of the accident in order to rebut the presumption of negligence."
The judge denied the request in question but allowed the following:
"4. The evidence of the defendant did not explain why one of the motors
failed to function within a few seconds after leaving the ground."
In
finding for the defendant, the judge found the following facts: (1) That
the defendant was not negligent in the management or operation of the
airship, and (2) that prior to the flight the defendant's pilot tested the
plane and found it in good working order. Held, on appeal from the
decision of the appellate division of the municipal court of Boston disr'issing the report (1931 U. S. Av. R. 109) the decision was affirmed. The
principle of res ipsa loquitur only applies where the direct cause of the accident and so much of the surrounding circumstances as were essential to its
occurrence were within the sole control of the defendant, and it will not
be applied if there is any other reasonable or probable cause from which it
might be inferred that there was no negligence at all. Wilson v. Colonial Air
Transport, Inc. (Mass. 1932), 180 N. E. 212.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur bids fair to become, in the absence of
controlling statutes, one of the most important factors applying to aviation
litigation. The question of whether or not the doctrine should be invoked
in case of damage by aircraft to persons or property carried is one with
which the courts will be called upon in the future to deal, in more instances
than perhaps any other type of airplane accident case. No set rule or
formula can be laid down to cover this doubtful situation in the abstract.
In Massachusetts at present there is no statute specifically applicable
to the issue of negligence in the operation of aircraft, and the ordinary rules
of negligence and due care obtain. See General Laws of Massachusetts
(1921), Chapter 90, Section 35 et seq. See further St. 1922, c. 534, as
amended by St. 1928, c. 388; St. 1930, c. 33; and St. 1931, c. 303.
The expression res ipsa loquitur is a shorthand method of saying that
the circumstances attendant upon an accident are themselves of such a
character as to permit an inference of culpability on the part of the defendant, make out the plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of
fact for the defendant to meet with an explanation: Plum v. Richmond
Light & R. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504, 25 A. L. R. 685 (1922) ; Sand
Springs Park v. Schrader,82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983, 22 A. L. R. 593 (1921) ;
Mayes v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 121 Kan. 648, 249 Pac. 599 (1926).
The mere fact of inji ry raises no presumption of negligence: Ash v. Childs
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Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86,120 N. E. 396, 4 A. L. R. 1556 (1918) ; Barger v.
Bissell, 188 Mich. 366, 154 N. W. 107 (1915); ii'rdo v. Valley Smokeless
Coal Co., 279 Pa. 209, 123 Atd. 779 (1924); the inf.trence of negligence
being deducible from the attendant circumstances: Marccau v. Rutland Ry.
Co., 211 N. Y. 203, 105 N. E. 206 (1914) ; 3 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.), sec.
480; and vanishing when evidence appears to the contrary: Cohen v. Farmers' Loan & Invest. Co., 127 N. Y. S. 561, 70 Misc. Rep. 551 (1911). The
doctrine applies whenever the thing which produced the injury is shown to
have been under the control of the defendant, and the occurrence is such
as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has been
exercised: Donohue v. U. S. Hoffman Mach. Corp., 218 N. Y. S. 558, 128
Misc. Rep. 521 (1926) ; Bolienbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670
(1930).
Acutely analyzed, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur merely connotes a
principle of evidence relating primarily to the probative force of evidence:
Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson (C. C. A. 3rd cir.) 287 F. 797 (1923) ; Rost v.
Kee & Chappell Dairy Co., 216 Ill. App. 497 (1920) ; and it does not relieve
the plaintiff of the burden of proving negligence: Arkansas Light & Power
Co. v. Jackson, 166 Ark. 633, 267 S. W. 359 (1924) ; but operates only to
make out a prima facie case of evidence of negligence: Lyon v. Chi. M. &
St. P. Ry. Co. of Montana, 50 Mont. 532, 148 Pac. 386 (1915).
The
doctrine has been termed "demonstrative evidence of negligence": I Thompson's Commentaries on the Law of Negligence (2nd ed.) sec. 15. However, the expressions res ipsa loquitur and prima facie evidence are often
used interchangeably, each expression signifying nothing more than evidence
to be considered by the jury: White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, i09 S. E. 31
(1921) ; cf. Cooper v. Agee, 222 Ala. 334, 132 So. 173 (1930).
Pleading specific acts of negligence, indicating that the plaintiff had the
sources of knowledge of the causes of the accident, has led to a division of
authorities as to whether the plaintiff, by so pleading, has elected riot to
rely at the trial upon the abstract doctrine of presumptive negligence, and
must prove affirmative negligence as pleaded. A number of jurisdictions
follow the rule that allegation of specific acts of negligence bars the plaintiff from relying upon the presumption of res ipsa loquitur: White v. Chi.
G. W. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. Ia.), 246 F. 427 (1917); Pate v. Dumbauld,
298 Mo. 435, 250 S. W. 49 (1923); Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Helms, 261
S. W. 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). But the majority of adjudications and the
better rule are to the effect that the doctrine is not excluded by the fact
that the plaintiff alleges specific acts of negligence: Rosenzweig v. Hines
(U. S. D. C. N. Y.) 280 F. 247 (1922); Union Gas & Electrir Co. v. Waldsmith, 31 Ohio App. 118, 166 N. E. 588 (1929) ; Stewart v. Barre & M. T.
& P. Co., 94 Vt. 39, 111 Atl. 526 (1920) ; Firszt v. Capital Park Realty Co.,
98 Conn. 627, 120 At. 300 (1923) ; 3 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) sec. 480. O,,
the general subject see Niles, "Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitur," 7 N. Y. L.
Quart. Rev. 415 (1929).
If the vehicle is a common carrier it would seem that proof of the
facts and surrounding circumstances need only be slight in order to set
the presumptive rule of negligence in motion and call upon the defendant
for an explanation: see 10 C. J. sec. 1 and sec. 1063. Yet in consideration
of the hazards incident to the more modern modes of travel, the present
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tendency is to hold that the carrier of passengers is bound to provide for
their safe conveyance as far as human care and foresight will go, or as
some courts have expressed it, "to exercise the highest or utmost degree
of care and diligence which human prudence and foresight will suggest in
view of the character and mode of conveyance employed:" 2 Hutchinson
on Carriers (2nd ed.) sec. 893.
The "raison d'etre" of the rule points to three considerations: (1) the
contractual relation between carrier and passenger under which the passenger
passively trusts himself to the safety of the carrier's means of transportation; hence the burden of explaining failure of performance should be on
the carrier; (2) the cause of the accident, if not exclusively within the
knowledge of the carrier, is usually better known to the carrier, and this
superior knowledge makes it just that the carrier should explain; (3) injury to a passenger by a carrier is something that does not usually happen
when the carrier is exercising due care, hence, the fact of injury affords a
presumption that such care is wanting: Steele v. Southern R. Co., 55 S. C.
389. 33 S. E. 509 (1899) ; Griffin v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925

(1901).
Thus while a sound application of analogous existing principles of the
common law will, so far as possible, furnish the basis for the ultimate
solution of many aeronautical problems, the ultimate result will be achieved
without much help from it in this instance because of its failure to have
envisaged the possibilities of human flight or that it would evolve into an
tablished vocation of man: see Osterhout, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa
In applying
Loquitur as Applied to Aviation," 2 Air L. Rev. 15 (1931).
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to travel by air, consideration should be
given to the extent of development and resultant safety of this mode of
travel as compared to others. With aviation still in its formative stage the
liability of the carrier should hardly be measured by the same rules of law
governing transportation by land or water; see Davis, Aeronautical Law,
p. 393.
It would seem that a more rational thought process would employ legal
theory to articulate rather than compel judgment. The ultimate question
appears to be the more important one of responsibiilty. In England, by
virtue of the Air Navigation Act of 1920, damages are recoverable without
proof of negligence, or intention, or other cause of action except where
the loss was caused by the plaintiff: see Nokes and Bridges, The Law of
Aviation, Ch. 7, p. 109. A similar provision is found in section 5 of the
Uniform State Law of Aeronautics. Thus the statutory rule of absolute
liability provided for in the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics automatically
eliminates from those states which have adopted it any possible issue of
negligence, and the res ipsa loquitur rule would not apply where there has
been no contributory negligence. So far as is known, the French have never
adopted the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as such: see Osterhout, supra; nor
does the doctrine prevail in Michigan: Kerr v. City of Detroit, 225 Mich.
446, 238 N. W. 190; Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 234 N. W. 170.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, from the aviation standpoint, not only
gives rise to a prima facie inference of negligence but likewise is so patent
that the facts and surrounding circumstances literally "speak for themselves." It is properly defined as a rule of evidence, an inference of fact,
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always rebuttable and never shifting the burder of proof, an inference
which weighs down the scales slightly for the plairntiff to begin with, but
but which may be accepted or rejected by the jury: see Osterhout, "The
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation," supra. Such a
rule would not impose an absolute liability but rather fix an intermediate
point between the rule of absolute liability and the ordinary rules of
negligence.
With reference to aviation cases, the doctrine has been exemplified in
the following instances. In Sollak v. State of New York (State N. Y. C. C.),
1929 U. S. Av. R. 42 (where the airplane struck a standing car and injured
the plaintiff who was a passenger therein) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was said to have raised a presumption of negligence on the part of the
airplane. This result seems to be in accord with the general principle that
an operator of aircraft descending on persons or property on the ground
beneath should be held to the strictest accountability: Guille v. Swan,
19 Johns (N. Y.) 381 (1822) ; see Baldwin, "Liability for Accidents in
Aerial Navigation," 9 Mich. Law Rev. 20 (1910) ; Bogert, "Problems in
Aviation Law," 6 Corn. L. Quart. 29 (1921). However, the view has been
taken that in the case of injuries to persons or property on the ground,
due to the fall of an airplane, there is either absolute liability or total lack
of liability, on the basis of contributory negligence or the fact that it was
an excusable trespass, and in neither event is the defendant's negligence
properly an issue: see Osterhout, supra. For a different view, see note,
Harper, "Res Ipsa Loquitur in Air Law," 1 Air Law Rev. 478 (1930). In
Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251,
1931 U. S. Av. R. 227 (reversing 1929 U. S. Av. R. 48) ; see note, 2 Air L.
Rev. 248 (1931) (where an airplane in perfect condition crashed shortly
after taking off, there being no evidence as to the cause), the jury was
instructed as to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur but nevertheless held ior
the defendant. In Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service (State N. Y.) 1930 U. S.
Av. R. 148 (growing out the same accident which was the subject matter
of the Seaman case,' supra), although an instruction covering the doctrine
was given, the court was emphatic in its admonition to the jury that the
action was one of negligence.
Obviously, if the defendant is a private carrier a greater degree of
fact proof of the surrounding circumstances would be required before invoking the rule: Greunke v. North American Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565,
230 N. W. 618, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 126; commented upon: 1 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 363. Reasonable care in the case of a common carrier by air means
a high degree of care: Hag ymasi v. Colonial Western (State N. J.) 1931
U. S. Av. R. 73; thus, the highest degree of care consistent with lie
practical operation of the airplane: Foot v. Northwest Airways (U. S. D.
C. Minn.) 1931 U. S. Av. R. 66; see comment, 2 Air L. Rev. 402 (1931).
The obverse side of this picture is the principle that a passenger in a
common carrier assumes the usual and ordinary perils incident to air
transportation over and above the perils against which the common carrier must guard: Allison, Adm'r. v. Standard Air Lines, Inc. (S. D. Cal.
1930) 1930 U. S. Av. R. 292. See also, note: 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 71.
Certain considerations militate against the application of the rule: (1)
accident causative statistics are as yet lacking in sufficient scientific com-
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pleteness to supply reliable information as to the reasons for such accidents,
(2) the cause of so many airplane disasters, to wit, the weather (thus the
assumption of risk) and, (3) the fact that aviation is as yet an infant
and that liability should not be imposed for accidents arising from defects
when every effort has been made to guard against such defects: see Allen,
"Transportation by Air and Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine," 16 Am. Bar Assoc. Jour. 455. Yet it frequently happens that evidence of aircraft disasters is practically unobtainable and for that singular but important reason
the view has been taken that the doctrine should be applied: see Bogert,
"Problems in Aviation Law," supia.
As there does not appear to have been any autopsy on the engine which
figured in this "Icarian flight," it would seem rather premature to say,
until the cause of the accident be known, that only lack of ordinary care
could have caused it. The plaintiff ought then recover, if at all, on the
theory of negligence. Such apparently was also the opinion of the appellate
court.
DAVID AXELROD.

DIGESTS
Plaintiff, the owner of suburban
AiaIPORTs-NuIsANCES.- [California]
property on the outskirts of the city of Los Angeles, sues the owner of
an adjoining airport, alleging that the defendant had leased its property to
persons engaged in commercial aviation and that as a result of the latter's
activities planes are flying over her property at altitudes of as low as 100
feet and that she is being annoyed by noise, dust and refuse, by parachute
jumps and forced landings on her property and by the entrance upon her
property of persons attracted to the airport. Defendant demurred. Held:
Demurrer sustained. The complaint does not allege that any of the conduct
complained of is committed by the defendant directly, but only that it is
committed by defendant's tenants. A landlord is not liable for a nuisance
committed by his tenant, unless either: (a) he has ratified or authorized
the nuisance, or (b) the nuisance is a necessary, not merely a possible, result of the letting. Neither of these is alleged here. Meloy v. City of Santa
Monica 70 Cal. App. Dec. 179 (July 5, 1932).
It is to be noticed that the case does not hold the conduct complained
of to be unactionable but merely that plaintiff had failed to allege responsibility for the conduct in the defendant airport owner. She had, in short,
not alleged that such activities were an essential and necessary consequence
of the mere operation of an airport-and such an allegation is requisite in
order to charge the owner (as distinguished from operator) of an airport.
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
BAILMENTS-LIABILITY OF BAILEE FOR INJURIES
CONTRACTs-LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY.-[California]

TO

BAILED

PROPERTY-

Plaintiff conducted a
flying school, in which defendant was a student. While flying one of plaintiff's planes, defendant had two accidents which caused injuries to the plane.
Thereafter he signed an agreement to pay "all cost of repairs and/or all
damage." He had a third accident necessitating repairs, as a result of
which plaintiffs lost the use of the plane for thirty-five days. Plaintiff,
alleging the agreement, sued for the cost of repairs on all three occasions
and for damages for loss of use on the last occasion. From a judgment
for plaintiff, defeadani appeals. Held: (1) defendant, being a bailee of
the airplane, was liable without an agreement for injuries caused by his
fault. The injuries having been caused by his acts, and he not having
excused them, plaintiff w.,s entitled to recover for them apart from the
contract, and the fact that his theory of action was erroneously based
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on the contract executed after two accidents had taken ,!lace will not justify
a reversal where his recovery was not increased by the mistake in theory.
(2) As to the third accident, defendant admits liability for the repairs.
Since the parties to a bailment may lawfully contract to limit liability,
plaintiff is entitled only to that amount of damages fixed in the contract
-which did not cover damages for loss of use. Therefore so much of the
judgment as gave a recovery for such loss of use must be reversed. Ambassador Airways, Inc. v. Frank, 69 Cal. App. Dec. 1007, 12 P. (2d) 127
(June 2, 1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
INSURANcE-REFUND OF PREMiuM-EFFECT ON AGENT'S COMMISSION.[New York] The plaintiff insurance company issued through the defendant,
its general agent under a written contract, certain policies covering aviation
hazards, and paid the defendant his commissions pursuant to the agency
contract. After the policies were placed, the assured corporation merged
and the new company negotiated with the plaintiff to cancel the aforementioned policies. As a result, the plaintiff repaid to the new company the
unearned premium on the policies and brought this action to compel the
defendant to repay his commission by virtue of the terms of the agency
contract. Attached to the policies was a stamped rider entitled "Minimum
Earned Premium" which read, ". . . no return premium shall be due
under Coverage 'B' in the event of the Insured requesting cancellation of
the policy, notwithstanding any policy conditions to the contrary. In the
event of cancellation * * * a pro rata return premium shall be allowed
the Insured." There being no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to
return unearned premiums, the plaintiff however choosing to return such,
the question then is whether the exercise of that option is binding on the
defendant.
The defendant is entitled to judgment. There being no basis for a suit
under the contract of agency, the complaint should be dismissed. The only
reference in the agency contract to the return of commission reads as
follows: "In the event of cancellation of any contract of insurance, or if
a refund premium is found due the assured on any policy after the termiration of the agency, it is understood and agreed that the General Agent
shall return to the Company a pro rata portion of commission on that part
of the premium on which it may be necessary for the Company to refund
to the assured. * * *" Therefore, the plaintiff by voluntarily making a
refund, which it was under no obligation to do under the policies, cannot
be deemed to have done that which was necessary within the meaning of
the agency contract. Aero Ins. Co. v. Rand, 258 N. Y. S. 381 (July 1, 1932).
DAVID AXELROD.
NEGLIGENCE-COLLISION OF AIRCRAFT-INSTRUCTIONS.- [California]
The
case of Ebrite v. Crawford, 67 Cal. App. Dec. 832, 5 P. (2d) 686 (Nov. 20,
1931) was transferred, upon petition of the appellants, to the Supreme
Court, which court approved and adopted the opinion of the District Court
of Appeal per Thompson, J. Ebrite v. Crawford, ... Cal ...
, 12 P. (2d)
937 (June 30, 1932).
For a digest, stating the facts of the case, see 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
462.
F. D. F.
NEGLIGENCE-COMMON CARRIERs--RES IPSA LoQuITUR.- [California] The
case of Smith v. O'Donnell, 67 Cal. App. Dec. 838, 5 P. (2d) 690 (Nov. 20,
1931) was transferred, upon petition of the appellant, to the Supreme Court,
which court approved and adopted the opinion of the District Court of
Appeal per Thompson, J. Smith v. O'Donnell, ... Cal. ... , 12 P. (2d) 933
(June 30, 1932).

For a digest, stating the facts of this case, see 3

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

463.
F. D. F.
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NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY FOR Low FLIGHT OVER Fox FARM.-[Federal]
This was an action for damages, arising from the death of a number of
foxes and the premature birth of others, alleged to have resulted from the
negligent operation of the defendant's airplane which was flown over the
plaintiff's fox-breeding farm in violation of the regulations establishing a
minimum altitude of five hundred feet. It was claimed that the foxes were
frightened and terrorized, and that the resulting damage of $40,000 was a
consequence of the fright attributable to the operation of the defendant's
airplane.
Held, motion to direct a verdict for the defendant sustained. The
court indicated that, notwithstanding the rule of the Nebraska Supreme
Court, supported by a long line of cases, which permits recovery for fright
although there be no immediate physical injury-and many authorities to
the effect that where a wrong or negligent act causes an animal to be
frightened and coincident therewith a person to be hurt in a tangible wayin such cases where negligence is shown and the result is a direct and
proximate result of the negligence, recovery can be had, such appears to
be contrary to sound reasoning and in conflict with another long line of
cases. The infinite variety of frights, except in the case of concrete happenings, that are endured by human beings are beyond any feasible system
of compensation. The abstract notion that mere fright is compensable is
unsound public policy and rightfully declared to be so by the early courts
of England and the federal courts since then. The law ought to be the
same on reasoning and principle as to animals. The law is absolutely settled
in this jurisdiction [Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gelvin, 238 F. 14 (1917]
that an action for damages could not be predicated on mere fright. Furthel.
more there is insufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding as a fact
any substantial damage to the foxes occasioned by the fright, even if the
wrongs claimed were actual and damages were allowable. Also, the regulations concerning the altitude at which airplanes should be flown have the
force and effect of law, and if actionable wrong and injury could be shown
from the operation of the plane below that altitude, there would be prima
facie evidence of negligence and actionable wrong. Nebraska Silver Fox
Corporation v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., U. S. Dist. Ct. Neb. (Feb. 24,
1931-unreported).*
DAVID AXELROD.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.-[Wisconsin]

De-

ceased worked for one Peterson in the latter's garage. One Boland was
engaged in the distribution of circulars from an airplane-an enterprise in
which neither Peterson nor the, deceased had any interest. As Boland required the presence of a passenger to throw out the circulars, it had been
arranged that Peterson should take a ride and perform this service. Peterson being unable to go, suggested the deceased-it being testified that this
was done because of a fear that deceased would feel slighted if he were
not offered the ride. Held, the evidence is sufficient to support the finding
of fact by the Commission that deceased's presence in the plane was for
the purpose of his own pleasure and was not connected with his employ,
ment by Peterson. Findings of fact by the Commission, if supported by
evidence, are conclusive. Indrehbo v. Industrial Commission, ... Wis.
243 N. W. 464 (June 20, 1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INFANTS-MINOR

AS EMPLOYER-

JOINT LIA-

BILITY.-[New York] Defendant Bethel, an infant, and one Kay, an adult,
were engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire in an airplane.
Claimant was a pilot employed by them. After the accident, on coming
*The decision of the court, by Woodrough, J., was furnished the AIR
LAW INSTITUTE through the courtesy of Brogan, Ellick & Van Dusen of Omaha,

counsel for defenrn.nt, and Rosewater, Mecham, Burton, Hasselquist & Chew
of Omaha, counsel fr plaintiff.
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of age, Bethel sought to disaffirm the contract of employment and now
claims exemption from liability under the workmen's compensation act.
Held, as the contract of employment by the infant was nct void but voidable, and as the liability under the Act applies automatically if there is a
contract of employment, the infant cannot avoid liability for an accident
which occurs prior to his disaffirmance. (The court then discusses the
respective liabilities of Bethel and Kay.) Rahman v. Bethel, 236 App. Div
182, 258 N. Y. S. 286 (July 1, 1932).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.

